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Abstract
Two-sided markets are an important aspect of today’s economies. Yet, the
attention they have received in economic theory is limited, mainly due to
methodological constraints of conventional approaches: two-sided markets
quickly lead to non-trivial dynamics that would require a computational ap-
proach, as analytical models quickly become intractable.
One approach to this problem is to opt for models that operate on an
aggregated level, abstracting from most of the (micro-level) causes of these non-
trivial dynamics. Here we revisit a well known equilibrium model by Rochet
and Tirole of two-sided markets that has taken this approach. Analyzing the
model from an agent-based perspective, however, reveals several inconsistencies
and implicit assumptions of the original model. This, together with the highly
implausible assumptions that are required to make the model analytically
tractable, limits its explanatory power significantly and motivates an alternative
approach.
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The agent-based model we propose allows us to study the phenomenon of
two-sided markets in a more realistic and adequate manner: Not only are
we able to compare different decision making rules for the providers, we are
also able to study situations with more than two providers.Thus, our model
represents a first step towards a more realistic and policy-relevant study of
two-sided markets.
Keywords: Two-sided markets; Network externalities; Agent-based modeling; Simula-
tion; Heuristic decision making; Reinforcement learning; Satisficing; Differential evolution;
Evolutionary economics; Market structure; IT economics; Equilibrium dynamics
1. Introduction
Two-sided-markets (TSM) are of tremendous significance in the economy: a market is
called two-sided if there are two groups of customers, usually buyers and sellers, that
require the service of a third party to conduct transactions with each other. This third
party is called provider. Examples for TSM include credit card systems (where the provider
is the credit card company), video games (where the provider is the producer of video
game consoles) or personal computers (where the provider is the producer of an operating
system).1
TSM pose huge difficulties for conventional economic analysis: the complex interaction
among the three types of agents quickly yields nonlinear dynamics that are very difficult
to capture with standard equilibrium models. One reason is that the provider’s service
exhibits network externalities in the sense that her service becomes more valuable to the
customers the more customers are already signed up. Usually, network externalities for
users of any one side are generated by the network of users on the other side. In such
cases, customers of both sides must be present for the network externalities to materialize
either directly or indirectly. On top of this, the strategy space for the provider is at least
four dimensional, as she can charge customers for general membership in her network,
and per executed transaction through his network. She can also set different prices for
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the two sides. In extreme cases one side might even be subsidized (i.e. ‘charged’ negative
prices). This is a common business practice : temporary premium benefits or even
monetary incentives, for example, are frequently offered for new users in online market
platforms. Credit card companies for instance often maintain bonus point systems and
may give cash rewards to frequent users.
In this paper we contribute to a better understanding of TSM on two levels: On
the methodological level we illustrate the inadequacy of an equilibrium approach to the
study of TSM. We do this by focusing on one of the canonical equilibrium models, the
one by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006). Analytically we show that the model remains
intransparent regarding the strong assumptions required to ensure a unique and stable
equilibrium. We also build a computational agent-based version of the model that helps
to make transparent many of the other implicit assumptions made by Rochet and Tirole –
a strategy that has proven successful since at least Gode and Sunder (1993). By doing so
we illustrate the limitations of the analytical equilibrium-approach: in order to keep the
model tractable one needs to reduce the possibility space for the providers to a minimum,
and must assume away most of the non-linearities present in the system. The resulting
models are unable to capture either the price differentiation between different user groups,
business strategies that depend on disentangling entry and transaction fees, or the true
uncertainty faced by the providers. This would be less severe if the consequences of these
implausible assumptions were negligible. But thanks to its modularity, our computational
model shows that taking even a small step towards a more realistic description of the TSM
system has significant consequences. This raises the methodological concern of whether
equilibrium models are credible means to study TSM at all.
Our second contribution is on the substantial level and consists of the ABM as such:
our model is able to capture the most important aspects of TSM and provides some first
key insights into the functioning of TSM that already go beyond what can be achieved
with current equilibrium models. In particular we are able to show how the number of
providers affects the market outcome, what kinds of strategies providers can develop to
sustain their profits (and what kinds of strategies are likely to fail), and what regularities
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or characteristics are to be expected in the development of these systems. Our model
thus represents a first step in studying TSM from an ABM perspective and serves as an
illustration of both the usefulness and the necessity of such an approach.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: After giving a short overview over
the existing literature in section 2, section 3 explains the fundamental problems of the
equilibrium approach to TSM as taken by Rochet and Tirole (2006). A rigorous discussion
of the model – which provides analytical insights that go beyond what Rochet and Tirole
show in their papers – can be found in the appendix. Section 4 introduces our ABM and
illustrates how sensitive the results of the equilibrium model depend on several crucial
assumptions. In section 5 we discuss the additional insights that can be derived from our
computational model before we conclude in section 6.
2. Literature review
The concept of two-sided markets was originally developed in the literature on banking
and credit card systems to study the coordination of prices and fees between the involved
financial institutions.2 The term was first used in Rochet and Tirole (2003) which was
previously published as a working paper in 2000. It was quickly realized that network
externalities are an important feature of the systems under investigation without which
those systems could not be properly understood. Subsequent models (Rochet and Tirole,
2003, 2006; Armstrong, 2006; Choi, 2010; Peitz et al., 2011) therefore generally referred to
the game-theory-based equilibrium and welfare analysis of network externalities following
Katz and Shapiro (1985). They did, however, ignore the literature on path-dependence,
lock-in, and non-equilibrium systems (David, 1985; Arthur et al., 1987) that are likely to
arise from network externalities. From this perspective, and considering the argument that
real business strategies are too complex to be captured by simple optimization behavior,
computational non-equilibrium methods such as agent-based simulations seem to be an
intuitive modeling choice. Indeed, in recent years, this approach to TSM is reluctantly
taken: Peitz et al. (2011) perform Monte Carlo simulations to find optimal strategies
in their model. Meyer (2012) proposes an agent-based model of two-sided markets but
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mainly to investigate the network effects. He keeps pricing exogenous and focuses on
computationally establishing the viability of his theoretical results. We now try to close
the existing research gap by proposing a full-fledged agent-based model that can be used
to study the pricing behavior in TSM.
3. Formal problems in the canonical Rochet-Tirole model
Analytical equilibrium models are currently the standard way to analyze TSM. It is one
of the main messages of the present article that such an approach can come with some
serious drawbacks. We chose the model of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) to illustrate
this drawbacks since it is often considered a canonical model for TSM and is therefore
representative for the conventional treatment of TSM.
The Rochet/Tirole model – as most equilibrium models – consists of 3 types of agents,
buyers, sellers, and one single provider. Every buyer potentially interacts with every seller
and the provider is able to facilitate all resulting transactions which are a constant share
of all potential transactions - a strong assumption justified by the authors by referring to
it as being common practice (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 652).
Buyers and sellers receive a total benefit from being part of the provider’s network and
a per-transaction benefit. The provider charges them a membership fee and a transaction
fee while incurring a per-customer and a per-transaction cost. The authors then postulate
the existence of a unique equilibrium for the respective sizes of the network and derive
some comparative statics results for the resulting prices.
Such an approach is, however, not without difficulties. One problem of the model is
its lack of transparency concerning the mathematical derivations and assumptions. We
therefore provide a detailed and rigorous description of the model that goes beyond what
Rochet and Tirole offer in their papers in the appendix. Here we focus on the fundamental
problems of their approach to justify an alternative treatment of TSM that encompasses
these limitations.
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3.1. Incapacity to consider asymmetry among buyers and sellers
Rochet and Tirole use the product of the total number of buyers as sellers as a proxy of
the actual number of transactions. This implies the probability of interaction between
any buyer and seller agent as equal. This is not the case in real-life interaction networks.
The assumption not only cuts away a large part of the micro-layer of the system but
also renders any distinction between entry fee and per-transaction fee irrelevant. For
heterogeneous interaction frequencies, high entry fees would encourage membership among
more well-connected, more central agents while high per-transaction fees would discourage
this (and in relative terms would encourage membership among less well-connected agents
instead). Credit card systems serve as an illustrative example: it must be assumed that
geographical distance matters for the interaction patterns and that some buyers travel
more widely than others, and that some sellers tend to cater to larger or geographically
more dispersed groups of buyers. It is likely that the providers’ strategies take such things
into account.
3.2. Necessity to assume perfect information of customers
Rochet and Tirole assume that agents can calculate their utility from being part of a
provider network in advance. However, one of the central problems for all customers
in the real world is that their utility of a provider network depends on the numbers of
members of this network. This leads to a recursive relationship between the buyer and
seller expectations that is a key aspect of TSM, but which is simply assumed away in the
model. The assumption is also an unnecessary as Rochet and Tirole assume the system
to converge towards a unique and stable equilibrium. In this case agents should arrive
at the same result by just using past utilities as a proxy for the expected outcome of the
current period - a far more realistic scenario which has been explored in the agent-based
simulation in section 4.
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3.3. Transformation of the system into a per-transaction mode
Rochet and Tirole transform all costs and utilities into a per-transaction mode. This means
that all per-customer terms (the entry fees Ai, utility from network membership, Bi, and
true costs, Ci) get divided by the expected number of transactions for that customer. This
facilitates the derivation of an equilibrium and removes all remaining differences between
entry fees and per-transaction fees which in turn generates problems for computational
algorithms in which the provider uses the same optimization as a basis for her strategy:
For the provider, there is no ex-ante difference between raising entry fees or transaction
costs. However, ex-post, customers do not have an incentive to pay high per-transaction
costs after gaining access to the network paying a still low (or negative) entry fee.
3.4. Negative per-transaction benefits for the customers cannot be considered
The customer’s utility function (see equation 1 in the appendix) is assumed to be increasing
in the number of customers from the other side, starting from a negative intercept
(otherwise, no equilibrium solution would exist, see equation 5 in the appendix). This
means, customers would not have a dominant incentive to join the network if there are
no customers of the respective other type. In reality, network externalities dictate the
provider to first build her user base (by setting negative fees, paying the first users to join
the network) before network externalities emerge which can then be harvested by setting
positive fees.The software industry provides many examples for such strategies. Further,
it is also a potential business strategy to subsidize one side of the market (e.g. the buyers)
entirely from the fees payed by the other side. Both cases are plausible and many examples
in the real world exist, but they are obviously beyond the scope of the model.
3.5. Assumption of an unique equilibrium
For equilibrium treatments of TSM to be useful, the assumption that the system under
investigation is near a unique and stable equilibrium must be plausible. For TSM this
is generally not the case. Unfortunately, equilibrium approaches cannot deal with this
problem adequately. Rochet and Tirole (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 653) for instance
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refer to the existence of such an equilibrium under “regularity conditions” – but it remains
unclear what these conditions are.
This is particularly relevant since an algebraic derivation of these conditions is tremen-
dously complex, even for the most simple possible case. A detailed analytical treatment
of the problem is provided in appendix B. Here we focus on the key message: In many
plausible situations we can show that there is no unique equilibrium and equilibrium
models in the style of Rochet and Tirole are unable to say anything about how TSM work
in such cases. For example, if some people use their credit cards all the time, while others
use them only for specific purposes, such as making hotel reservations or booking flights,
we will have a system of demand functions with four equilibria only two of which would
be stable. See Figure 11 in Appendix B.
The Rochet-Tirole model generally neglects such cases. It’s central result – that TSM
conform to the Lerner equation prescribing an equal ratio between prices and price-
elasticities of demand for both seller and buyer prices – is difficult to test as all the relevant
terms in the model mutually depend on each other and only price and demand can be
isolated empirically. Given their methodological focus on equilibrium models, Rochet and
Tirole are unable to provide any general conclusions beyond saying that higher numbers
“captive” customers of type i lead to higher prices for type i: a larger number of already
committed sellers prompts the provider to set lower prices for buyers and increase the
price for sellers (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 659).
This criticism applies to a wide range of equilibrium models and illustrates the funda-
mental problems of an equilibrium approach to a situation in which mutual dependency
and continuous change are essential properties of the system under investigation.
4. An agent-based model of TSM
We now describe our ABM. Because the focus is on studying the price setting behavior of
the provider, the customer agents are held as simple as possible. An overview over the
parameters of the model can be found in table 1.
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Symbol Name Description Default value
Aifixed Fixed entry fee
Relevant only in the
optimization case
(endogenous otherwise)
(0,−200)
N˜B
Number of
buyers - 10000
N˜S
Number of
sellers - 2000
N˜P
Number of
providers - 1, 10
Cfixed
Provider fixed
cost - 10000
Ci
Per customer
fixed costs
Costs incurred to the
provider for every
customer.
50
ci
Per transaction
costs
Costs incurred to the
provider for every
transaction.
25
tmax
Nb. of time
steps - 500
-
Nb. of
transactions per
iteration
- 30000
- Subscriptionthreshold
Customers do not try to
subscribe to further
providers if their revenue
is below the threshold
400
p¯
Mean
reservation price
prB ∝ U(p¯, 1.5p¯) and
prB ∝ U(0.5p¯, p¯) 1000
cR Roaming costs
Costs incurred to
customers when using the
network of a provider they
have no subscription with.
100
F Entry fee range Range of admissible entryfees. (−3000, 5000)
F
Transaction fee
range
Range of admissible
transaction fees. (−1000, 1010)
- Ema-Faktor
Exponential moving
average factor governing
the adaptation speed of
the reinforcement learning
mechanism
0.01
Table 1: The relevant fixed parameters of the ABM. Note that the main drivers for the
results of the model are the particular provider decision making algorithm chosen.
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4.1. The customers
4.1.1. Construction of the agents
The customer agents are instantiated either as buyers or sellers. Their type remains
constant over time. While we also studied the impact of varying group sizes on the model
output (see section 5 and figure 2), we use, where not indicated otherwise, a standard
setting with 2000 sellers and 10000 buyers. Agents start in t0 with a wealth of zero and are
heterogeneous concerning their per-transaction benefits, bi.5 This benefit changes every
round and is drawn from a uniform distribution.
There are two reasons for these assumptions: Firstly, this largely fulfills the assumption
of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) with one stable equilibrium. Secondly, the main interest
of the present research is not the influence of particular distributions of preferences, but
the pricing behavior of the providers.
At t0 all customers are subscribed to one of the providers chosen randomly for each
customer.
4.1.2. Decision making of the agents
For a constant number of transactions in every round, two customers (one buyer and one
seller) are chosen randomly. Each of those transactions is conducted only if a positive
transaction benefit (shared equally afterwards6) remains for the two customers after
subtraction of per-transaction prices they would incur in conducting the transaction.
In every round, agents may decide to join one of the provider’s networks. In the model
by Rochet and Tirole, the decision is made according to the following formula (which has
been adjusted for the discrete case):
bik +
Bi − Ci
N jt−1
≥ pit−1 = aik +
Ai − Ci
N jt−1
.
bik +
Bi
N jt−1
≥ pit−1 = aik +
Ai
N jt−1
.
The condition is most conveniently verified by assessing whether or not the agent
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incurred losses by participating in the network (of this particular provider) in the last
period. We therefore translate these function into the following decision algorithm for
agent k (assuming k is a seller and that the number of buyers in the network has not yet
been updated; we also assume that if the agent is not subscribed to any provider, one is
randomly assigned with a moderate probability of 10%7):
Algorithm 1 Decision making algorithm for customer k.
if providerlistk! = {} then
for all P ∈ providerlistk do
if revenue from transactions using provider P is < 0 then
remove P from providerlistk
end if
end for
end if
if providerlistk = {} and with probability 0.1 or revenuek > 400 then
Select random provider P0
Add P0 to providerlist
end if
A particular provider is selected randomly by the agent with the probability to select
provider i being a monotonly increasing function of the share of customers already
subscribed to provider i.
4.2. The provider agent
We consider three different price setting strategies for the provider (see table 2).
In the first case the provider optimizes his profits using a differential evolution algo-
rithm.This algorithms helps her compute the optimal entry fees and per interaction fees
to be charged from the buyers and sellers. The differential evolution algorithm allows us to
study a generative version of the Rochet-Tirole model and to compare it against the other
cases as a benchmark. It is certainly the closest replication of a rational choice setting
that we can get in a computational context. For such a quasi rational choice setting to
be tractable, many unrealistic and implausible assumptions such that the provider knows
the exact shape of the demand function he faces are required. This setting represents,
however, a benchmark against which the other, more realistic versions of the model can
be compared. It therefore allows us to test whether the inadequacy of the assumptions
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necessary in the equilibrium context does matter for the outcome of the model. If it
doesn’t, the use of equilibrium models a la Rochet and Tirole could still be justified on the
grounds that assumptions in economic models are always to a certain degree unrealistic,
but that this ‘unrealisticness’ does not matter too much.
In order to go beyond the unrealistic assumptions of the original model and to get
alternatives to this rational choice benchmark, we implement the model with two versions
of a reinforcement learning algorithm for the provider. Providers that use the reinforcement
learning algorithm to set entry fees and per interaction fees adapt their price setting
strategies according to their success in the past. Such behavior does not involve many of
the unrealistic assumptions necessary in the benchmark (such as complete knowledge of
the demand functions) and is compatible with the basic notion of bounded rationality. We
study the model with and without a satisficing element in the strategy algorithm. Because
the computational simplicity of the reinforcement learning mechanism, we are also able to
study the behavior of the model with more than one provider.
4.2.1. Instantiation of the provider agent
The provider gets instantiated with a list recording the subscriptions and the profits.
Depending on which case of table 2 we consider, she is assigned a strategy according to
which she sets the entryfees and per transaction fees. This can be either a differential
evolution algorithm that should mimic an optimal and rational choice (to replicate the
results of Rochet and Tirole) or a reinforcement learning algorithm, which represents a
more realistic scenario of how the providers set their prices.
4.2.2. Price setting strategies for the provider
Provider decision using a differential evolution algorithm Every round the provider
maximizes her profits using a differential evolution algorithm (Storn and Price, 1997).
Such optimization algorithms require the provider to be informed about the distribution
of the reservation prices and the types of the customer agents. Therefore, this decision
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Cases considered
Provider
decision
making
Description Oneprovider
Ten
provider
fixed
entry
fees
endoge-
nous
entry
fees
Optimiza-
tion
algorithm
The provider
knows the
distribution of the
customers
reservation prices
and uses a
differential
evolution
algorithm to
optimize his profit
every round.
X X
Reinforce-
ment
learning
The provider
changes the
transaction and
subscription fees
for the customers
depending on
whether his
revenues have risen
of fallen compared
with the previous
round.
X X X
Reinforce-
ment
learning
with
satisficing
In this case the
provider stops
changing his
strategy after
having reached a
satisfying level of
profits.
X X X
Table 2: An overview of the cases considered in our simulation model.
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making algorithm is not very realistic and used only to replicate the results of Rochet and
Tirole in a generative and agent-based framework and to serve as an ideal benchmark case
that can be compared to other decision making concepts. It illustrates, however, some
of the fundamental difficulties of Rochet and Tirole’s model that remain unaddressed in
an analytical framework: While the algorithm is rather successful in finding optima on
not too rugged target functions and works very well for per-transaction fees for buyers
and sellers (as, aB) as free variables (with fixed entry fees AS, AB), it fails in cases where
the provider must set all four variables (AS, AB, as, aB).8 This indicates that assuming a
provider acts in an optimizing way is a very misleading assumption, rather than a useful
abstraction of reality.
Provider decision algorithm using reinforcement learning A more realistic conception of
the decision making process is to use a reinforcement learning algorithm9: in this case,
the distribution of bi and Bi remain unknown to the provider. Instead, she considers her
success in the past and adjusts her prices accordingly.
There are three different ways the provider can adjust her prices: firstly, to continue
using the current price, secondly, to increase the prices towards some maximum value and,
thirdly, to decrease the prices towards a (negative) minimum value.10All three possibilities
are assigned a certain probability weight that gets adjusted according to the success of the
provider compared to past revenues.
Practically, the provider decides according to the following procedure:
1. It firstly checks whether she can match her operating costs. If not, then the current
strategy gets discouraged strongly and the strategy is set back to a sustainable
(though not necessarily very successful) inital value.11
2. It then takes the revenue of the previous round as a relative success measure.12
3. The probability weights of all strategies are adjusted, with the probability weight of
the current strategy increased if the strategy was successful, otherwise decreased.
4. The provider chooses new prices according to the current probability weights.
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Provider decision algorithm using reinforcement learning with satisficing The above
reinforcement learning strategy may be extended to include satisficing in the sense of
Simon (1955). In this case, before step 3 in the above algorithm, the provider checks
whether a stisficing level of revenue and number of customers is reached. If this is the case,
the strategy is not changed and the provider simply applies the same strategy again. If no
satisficing level is reached, the provider acts identically as above.
4.3. Summary of the simulation
Here we summarize the sequence of events for the whole simulation. Note that a well
documented version of the source code is also available.
1. Create the agents
2. Set global provider choice functions containing probability weights for the choice of
providers by customers.
3. Create initial allocation of buyer and seller agents to providers (random uniform).
4. Iteration for the specified time steps. Each time step consists of six stages:
1st Stage: Realization of the transactions.
i. Choose new reservation prices for all buyers and sellers.
ii. Conduct the specified number of transactions
A. Seller and buyer are randomly chosen
B. Compare the reservation prices prB and prS. Continue only if prB > prS.
C. Identify cheapest available channel of transmission between buyer and
seller (depending on their subscriptions) and the corresponding trans-
action cost ct.
D. If p
r
B−prS
2
> ct, the transaction is conducted, buyers and sellers receivep
r
B−prS
2
each, the providers are awarded the transaction costs.
2nd Stage: Customers pay the fees to the provider
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3nd Stage: Providers pay fixed costs and per-customer costs.
4th Stage: Data gets collected and evaluated.
5th Stage: Unsubscription decisions by the customers and adjustment of the
providers’ network weights.
6th Stage: Subscription decisions of the customers.
i. A customer subscribes to a provider if either of the following is true:
• If she has more revenue left than a threshold value.
• If the customer currently has no provider she has to subscribe to a
provider with probability of 0.1. This is necessary to ensure that
customers do not immediately join the same unfavorable provider.
ii. A random provider is chosen.
7th Stage: Reset weights of providers and customer’s period variables (money,
income, revenue,...)
8th Stage: Provider set entry fees and transactions fees for buyers and sellers.
5. Simulation results
5.1. Optimal provider decision using a differential evolution algorithm
Simulation results for rationally optimizing providers are shown in figures 1 (buyer and
seller transaction prices) and 3 (welfare distribution).
As expected, the provider consistently chooses the same prices in every time period. The
unbiased random distortion arise from imperfections in the approximative optimization
algorithm. This leads to a stable overall result after a potential initial adjustment of
the size of the networks (agents with low bi leaving). The result is also invariant with
respect to the number of providers as all rational optimizers will compute the same optimal
prices: as the increasing returns brought about by the network externalities favor large
competitors, all but one of these providers will fade into obscurity while one will take over
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the entire population and continue identically to the case of just one provider. Since the
rational optimizers are by design perfectly informed (see section 4.2), they outcompete
heuristic decision-makers when confronted with them.
The rationally optimizing provider is included as a benchmark case and as a point of
comparison to Rochet and Tirole’s model. While it would be as difficult to scrutinize
whether the Lerner formula holds (Rochet and Tirole’s central result) as it is in reality,
Rochet and Tirole’s interpretation of the same as more ”captive” customers of type i
leading to higher prices for this type can be verified. The present ABM does not allow
for ”captive” customers, but higher numbers of buyers relative to that of sellers do indeed
lead to higher prices for buyers and lower ones for sellers. Figure 2 shows the prices set by
rational optimization with differential evolution for different numbers of buyers compared
to a constant 2000 sellers (with a constant expected potential number of transactions per
customer). The result of the equilibrium model is nicely reproduced and has an intuitive
interpretation: the smaller group has a more powerful position that the larger group, as
they are important for the provider to build up a network. This, however, is but a tiny
part of the rich dynamics that result from the more realistic heuristic decision mechanisms
below.
Interestingly, the rational optimization mechanism only works well with fixed entry
fees, i.e. with only the transaction fees being subject to optimization. Simultaneous
optimization of all four terms fails, non-optimal prices are set, and the network collapses.
This is because most parameter settings then lead to empty networks and thus a (constant)
non-existing profit with nothing to optimize. The field of successful values is small and
accidentally hit by the initial population only in rare cases. This is yet another powerful
argument against the use of models that simply assume that such unique and stable
equilibria exist and can be reached by the provider.
In summary, our model is able to transfer the basic model by Rochet and Tirole into an
agent-based framework and to study the importance of several particular assumptions. The
difficulties we encounter cast serious doubts on whether the equilibrium-based approach is
useful in the context of TSM.
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Figure 1: Transaction costs charged by the rational optimization provider with fixed
subscription costs for both types of customers (upper panel 0, lower panel 200),
averages over 100 runs.
18
103 104
Number of buyers
190
195
200
205
210
215
220
M
a
x
 n
b
 o
f 
cu
st
o
m
e
rs
Buyer transaction price
Seller transaction price
Figure 2: Transaction prices after 40 iterations depending on the the number of buyers
compared to a constant number of 2000 sellers, averages over 100 runs.
5.2. Reinforcement learning and satisficing
Using the reinforcement learning algorithm for the decision making of the providers allows
us both to drop unrealistic assumptions - e.g. the perfect information about demand
functions and the ability to perform the optimization - and to let the provider set the
entryfees for the customers endogenously. However, the results are more volatile and
path dependent than for the differential evolution algorithm case. The system does not
converge towards an equilibrium. Instead it follows certain quasi-periodical patterns; once
the different runs are out of sync, the corridor of results widens, although the simulation
still indicates a clear corridor in which the results can be found.
Different from perfect optimization, the behavior varies across customers. A selection
mechanism works on the providers’ strategies in the form of customers joining networks
with more favorable price setting and generating both network externalities and revenue
there. The selection mechanism does, however, only function if there is competition.
Consequently, simulation runs with a only single provider generally result in malicious
pricing behavior, destruction of the network and complete failure (see the number of
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Figure 3: Development of the total revenue and its distribution resulting in settings with
rational optimization providers with fixed subscription fee (upper panel 0, lower
panel −200), averages over 100 runs.
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Figure 4: Development of the number of customers in the (largest) network of reinforcement
learning providers, mean and 90% quantiles from 200 runs. The lower black
lines indicate the lower bound of customers in the network from random trial
and error joining of the providers’ networks.
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Figure 5: Development of the number of customers in the (largest) network of 10 compet-
ing providers following reinforcement learning with satisficing, mean and 90%
quantiles from 200 runs.
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customers as shown in figure 4). Without satisficing (upper left panel), only the 10%
customers that randomly join the provider’s network before leaving it again in the following
period remain. As this is an artifact of the simulation design, this strategy can be considered
to be absolutely unsuccessful. With satisficing (upper right panel), the provider may
succeed, but the network still breaks down in more than 60% of the runs. In case of
multiple (in our case ten) competing providers, the network is successfully established in
many runs both with and without satisficing. With satisficing (lower right panel), the
average number of customers shows a clear upward trend, something that does not occur
for the setting without satisficing (lower left panel) because reinforcement learning can
lead to overshoots (driving prices too high or too low) if satisficing does not freeze the
strategy at some satisfactory setting. It is important that the heuristic decision making
provider is more successful if the range of possible successful price settings is larger, e.g. if
ceteris paribus the fixed costs the provider faces are lower. This is shown for the case with
ten provider employing reinforcement learning with satisficing in figure 5. If the viable
range of successful strategies is lower, the probability to hit one of them by chance is lower
and the expected time to the successful establishment of a network by any one of the
providers increases.
As a single provider is usually not able to build up a functioning network, we are now
focusing on the cases of ten providers and study the path dependent pricing decisions
in more detail. Analogous to figures 1 and 3 for the rational optimization case, figures
6 and 8 show the development of buyer and seller prices as well as revenue and its
distribution on buyers, sellers and providers for all reinforcement learning providers with
(upper panel) and without (lower panel) satisficing. As seen in figure 6, both types of
providers systematically charge a higher subscription fee for the larger group, the buyers.
This corresponds to the pattern seen both in figure 2 for rational optimization and in
Rochet and Tirole’s anecdotal evidence and inferred by them to be a result of the Lerner
equation. However, the present result is more nuanced: The opposite pattern can be
seen for transaction fees, here the customers in the smaller group, the sellers, are charged
more. It is crucially important for the provider to have enough members of the smaller
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group in the network such that sufficiently many interactions can take place. With this
accomplished, a higher per-transaction fee can be charged, and it here, the sellers, the
members of the smaller group, are charged slightly more, as they have a larger expected
number of transactions than the buyers as a result of the different group sizes and the
uniform interaction probability. Note that the same pattern can currently be observed for
for credit card systems in the US with providers subsidizing the buyer side with generous
benefits while charging the merchant side. Of course in this case, the merchants simply
pass on the fees to the buyers in the form of extra charges for credit cards.
Transforming all the different types of fees and prices into one single per-transaction
prices as done in Rochet and Tirole’s approach overlooks this pattern which furthermore
is of a strongly path-dependent nature (see figure 7). That is, it is statistically observable
in averages and quantiles of the distribution of results of many simulation runs, but there
are runs for which the reversed pattern emerges and persists partly or entirely over the
course of the simulation. The same path-dependence is of course found in other variables
including the size of networks, and the development of revenues.
Figure 8 shows the development of welfare (revenue) and its distribution. On average,
this is lower than in the rational optimization case (see above, figure 3) as the rational
optimizer has an unrealistic amount of information about the demand structure of the
market and is able to set optimal prices. However, consistently increasing absolute revenue
can be observed for the satisficing strategy (lower panels). It also attains disproportionately
higher levels for cases with lower fixed costs.13 The development of revenue is also path-
dependent: In some cases, the providers fail to successfully establish a functioning network
resulting in the loss of the network externalities that would both continue to sustain the
network and generate the bulk of the revenue.
In all cases, the smaller group, that of the sellers, is much better off as the provider
cannot afford losing their support and only hesitantly increases transaction prices for them
which also affects the buyer’s ability to conduct cost-effective transactions. In real-world
economic systems, the sellers may proceed to pass this entire fee on to the buyers (see
above).
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Figure 6: Development of subsciption and transaction fees in settings of 10 competing
providers following reinforcement learning with and without satisficing, averages
over 200 runs.
Considering these results from a policy perspective suggests that overall welfare could
be increased if the public agent supports providers in building up a well-functioning
network that generates positive externalities for all agents, and then provides incentives
for a sustainable satisficing strategy. This preliminary conclusion, however, illustrates
the intricacy of TSM and the need for their further investigation from an agent-based
perspective: the original Rochet Tirole model simply assumed away the complexity that
makes such policy questions both difficult and interesting.
6. Conclusions
The present paper contributes to the study of TSM in two respects: Firstly, on the
methodological level, we showed that studying two-sided markets with conventional
equilibrium models bears the danger to overlook the most fundamental features of these
markets. Secondly, on the substantial level, we introduced an agent-based model that
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Figure 7: Development of buyer transaction prices in 30 example runs with 10 providers
following reinforcement learning with and without satisficing.
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Figure 8: Development of provider, seller, and buyer revenue with 10 competing rein-
forcement learning providers with (lower panels) and without (upper panels)
satisficing, averages over 200 runs. The negative share of buyers in the cases
without satisficing indicates the unsustainability of this strategy.
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illustrates both the usefulness and necessity of a computational approach to the study of
TSM.
With regard to our methodological contribution: The most promising results obtained in
conventional equilibrium models are equilibrium conditions - such as the Lerner equation
in Rochet and Tirole’s approach - which can, given abundant confidence in the result, be
interpreted to account for specific pricing patterns - such as higher prices the customer
group with more ”captive” users.
While we have shown that it is possible to reproduce this in a much more realistic
agent-based setting with little difficulty, the universality of this result is highly doubtful
for two reasons:
Firstly, the entire equilibrium construct rests on an array of incredibly bold assumptions
as discussed in section 3. Our computational approach showed that this unrealisticness
matters because relaxing the strong assumptions changes the dynamics predicted by the
model significantly.
Secondly, agent-based simulations in section 5 also showed that once the assumption
of rational optimization with perfect information is relaxed, the dynamics of the system
become highly path-dependent. Universal prediction a la Rochet and Tirole is not
appropriate for such systems.
With regard to our second contribution, our ABM was able to generate the following
insights: First, heuristic decision algorithms, as considered here in the form of reinforcement
learning with and without Simonian satisficing, are able to distinguish effectively between
user groups and to set subscription and transaction fees accordingly. The dominant pattern
was found to be high subscription fees for the side with larger numbers of agents (buyers
in our case) in order to subsidize the smaller group while transaction fees were higher for
the smaller group that on average conducts more transactions.
Second, in order for the heuristic algorithms to work efficiently, a certain selection
pressure is essential. In our case, this was provided by competition between several
providers. In real-world economic systems, alternative technological paths are also feasible,
e.g. if the dominant video game platform providers charge excessively high prices, sooner
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or later, another technology will emerge in which the price-setting behavior happens to be
more moderate.
Third, we found relentless and myopic optimization, even with (or especially with)
heuristic decision algorithms to be susceptible to unsustainable decisions, specifically
overshooting prices. A simple modification, introducing satisficing into the decision
mechanism resolves this. Note that the decision mechanisms considered here are still
excessively simple, if not trivial. Nevertheless, their application to TSM represents a new
contribution to the literature and illustrates the point that decision makers using extremely
simple heuristics can achieve reasonable results. In real-world systems it is often observed
that providers spend long years and unbelievable amounts of money on building up an
installed base of users to generate network externalities and attract more users (this being
known as the ”burn rate” during the new economy bubble) before starting to make profits.
More successful examples include Google and Facebook, less successful (and hence today
also less well-known) ones include WorldCom, GeoCities, or Tiscali.
Fourth, a larger field of viable solutions which result in the successful establishment of a
network have a profound impact on the speed with which heuristic strategies are able to
find them. This translates directly into the probability of the emergence of a network which
would then be self-sustainable as a result of the network externality. Factors constraining
the size of this field are in our case operating costs of the providers; in real-world systems,
this would be complemented by technological aspects, such as the regulatory environment,
and cultural factors.
Finally, as compared to an unrealistic rational optimizer with perfect information, the
welfare-efficiency in terms of revenue generated for providers and both types of customers
is rather modest in heuristic optimization cases (and the rational optimizer may not
even constitute the welfare optimum). While more sophisticated heuristic strategies may
perform better, it is not likely that they will get close to the benchmark. As a complication,
any number of interfering effects may occur in real systems: technological lock-ins with huge
sunk costs, unsuccessful providers with a high initial ”burn rate” which then translates into
losses for investors or for the public, or the complete failure to establish a working network.
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The complicated two-sided network externality and the disparity between the provider’s
incentives and public interest and will in any case prevent any efficiency-optimizing effect
that may be present in other economic systems. That is not to say that TSM systems are
per se inefficient, merely that regulation can have and did have a positive effect on this.
While our proposed ABM is still exceedingly simple, the first results were already
promising and may serve as a starting point for further research. Several aspects naturally
warrant further investigation: the effect of non-homogeneous interaction patterns or a
non-trivial network structure between customers, more sophisticated strategies on the part
of the providers, and possible welfare-enhancing policy measures.
The methodological conclusion of this article is that all these important aspects require
an investigation from an agent-based rather than equilibrium perspective. This will also
facilitate the empirical assessment of the theories, since ABM enable us to investigate a
substantially wider variety of hypotheses both on the assumption and the conclusion side.
Acknowledgements
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Appendix
A. Rochet and Tirole’s Equilibrium Model of Two-Sided
Markets
Here we provide a detailed revision of the canonical TSM model as proposed by Rochet
and Tirole (2003, 2006).
A.1. Setting
There are 3 types of agents, buyers, sellers, and one single provider. As all buyers, N˜B,
will potentially interact with all sellers, N˜S, the provider must be able to facilitate all
N˜BN˜S transactions.
Buyers and sellers are denoted by superscript i ∈ {B, S}. They will receive a total
benefit from being part of the provider’s network of Bi and a per-transaction benefit of
bi. The provider charges them a membership fee of Ai and a transaction fee of ai while
incurring a per-customer cost of Ci and a per-transaction cost c. Call the number of
buyers and sellers in the network NB and NS respectively resulting in NBNS potential
transactions of which the number of actual transactions is a constant share. This is a
relatively strong assumption justified by Rochet and Tirole (2006, p. 652) with being
common practice.
This entails that from the agent’s point of view all agents of the other type (buyers
from the point of view of sellers and vice versa) are homogeneous; the only heterogenity
allowed in this model is that agents have different bi and Bi, which are assumed to be
continuously distributed (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, p. 999). Unfortunately, the particular
type of the distributions has not been further specified by the authors, a fact that causes
difficulties for the computational replication of their findings (see below). Further, the per-
transaction utilities are assumed to be constant over all transactions an agent participates
in independently of the transaction partner and any other factor. Rochet and Tirole make
a point of highlighting that this features non-rivalry (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 653).
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A.2. Buyer/Seller Decision Problem
The buyer’s and seller’s utilities U i consist of the net network utility, bi− ai, multiplied by
the network size in terms of members of the other type’s (potential transaction partners),
N j, and the net standalone utilities, Bi − Ai (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 653)
U i = (bi − ai)N j +Bi − Ai. (1)
Agents are assumed to be able to calculate their utility in advance. They will only become
part of the network if their utility is larger than zero, hence the network size can be
computed from the distribution of utilities, i.e. share of the agents whose utilities are
larger than zero N i = Pr(U ≥ 0)N˜ i (Rochet and Tirole denote Pr() as the absolute
frequency instead of the CDF, hence N i = Pr(U ≥ 0)) (network participation condition).
Rochet and Tirole then proceed to eliminate the network-level by and transform the
buyer’s and seller’s decision function into a per-transaction mode by dividing network
access fees and standalone benefits by the number of potential transaction partners (Rochet
and Tirole, 2006, p. 653) (or actual transaction partners, (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 654,
footnote 24)). In order to be able to more easily transform also the providers optimization
problem (equation 3) into a per-transaction form, they first subtract the per-member
cost for the provider of maintaining the network, Ci, thereby obtaining something like
the (per-transaction) value added (Bi − Ci or Bi−Ci
Nj
) or (per-transaction) profit (Ai − Ci
or Ai−Ci
Nj
). It does, however, not appear to change either the decision problems or the
equilibria in any substantial way. This yields a quasi-per-interaction-price (Rochet and
Tirole, 2006, p. 653)
pi = ai +
Ai − Ci
N j
.
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and a network participation condition
N i = N˜ iPr(U ≥ 0)
= N˜ iPr((bi − ai)N j +Bi − Ai ≥ 0)
= N˜ iPr
(
bi − ai + Bi−Ai
Nj
≥ 0
)
= N˜ iPr
(
bi − ai + Bi−Ai
Nj
+ ai + A
i−Ci
Nj
≥ ai + Bi−Ci
Nj
)
= N˜ iPr
(
bi − ai + Bi−Ai
Nj
+ ai + A
i−Ci
Nj
≥ pi
)
= N˜ iPr
(
bi + B
i−Ci
Nj
≥ pi
)
The network sizes N i thus take the form of functions of pi and N j (as all other parameters,
N˜ i,bi,Bi,Ci, are constants) which may be interpreted as demand functions
N i = Di(pi, N j)
(
= N˜ iPr
(
bi +
Bi − Ci
N j
≥ pi
))
such that a system
N i = Di(pi, N j) i, j = B, S, j 6= i (2)
is obtained in which the N j can be internalized, thus N i = ni(pi, pj) with i =∈ {B, S}.
The functions ni are characterized by their partial derivatives (with respect to the two
pi) which are obtained (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 653) from total differentiation of
N i = Di(pi, N j) = Di(pi, Dj(pj, N i))
dN i = ∂D
i
∂pi
dpi + ∂D
i
∂pi
(
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj + ∂D
j
∂N i
dN i
)
dN i = ∂D
i
∂pi
dpi + ∂D
i
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj + ∂D
i
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
dN i
1 = dN
i
dN i
= ∂D
i
∂pi
dpi
dN i
+ ∂D
i
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj
dN i
+ ∂D
i
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
= ∂D
i
∂pi
dpi
dN i
+ ∂D
i
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj
dN i
From this, dN i
dpi
can be obtained by letting dpj = 0 (this eliminates ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj
dN i
), resolving
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for dp
i
dN i
, and taking the inverse
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
= ∂D
i
∂pi
dpi
dN i
∂Di
∂pi
dpi
dN i
= 1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
dpi
dN i
=
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂Ni
∂Di
∂pi
dN i
dpi
=
∂Di
∂pi
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂Ni
.
Analogously, dN i
dpj
can be obtained by letting dpi = 0, resolving for dp
j
dN i
, and taking the
inverse
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
= ∂D
i
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj
dN i
∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dpj
dN i
= 1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂N i
dpj
dN i
=
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂Ni
∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
dN i
dpj
=
∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂pj
1− ∂Di
∂pi
∂Dj
∂Ni
.
The infinitesimal expressions dN i
dpi
and dN i
dpj
can then be inferred to take the same form.
A.3. Provider Decision Problem
The platform’s profit (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 654) is given by:
pi = (AB − CB)NB + (AS − CS)NS + (aB + aS − c)NBNS
= A
B−CB
NS
NBNS + A
S−CS
NB
NBNS + (aB + aS − c)NBNS
=
(
AB−CB
NS
+ aB + A
S−CS
NB
+ aS − c
)
NBNS
= (pB + pS − c)NBNS
= (pB + pS − c)nB(pB, pS)nS(pB, pS)
= (pB + pS − c)DB(pB, NS)DS(pS, NB)
= pBDBDS + pSDBDS − cDBDS
(3)
Here, NBNS is the number of potential transactions and thus Rochet and Tirole’s proxy
variable for the actual volume of transactions, V .
Neglecting the ∂Di
∂Nj
∂Nj
∂pi
terms (in their earlier paper the demands were defined as Di(pi),
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i.e. not depending on N j (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, p. 996)), maximization of equation 3
yields the first order conditions:
∂pi
∂pB
= DB(pB)DS(pS) + pB ∂D
B(pB)
∂pB
DS(pS) + pS ∂D
B(pB)
∂pB
DS(pS) + c∂D
B(pB)
∂pB
DS(pS) = 0
= DB(pB)DS(pS) + (pB + pS − c)∂DB(pB)
∂pB
DS(pS) = 0
∂pi
∂pS
= DB(pB)DS(pS) + pB ∂D
S(pS)
∂pS
DB(pB) + pS ∂D
S(pS)
∂pS
DB(pB) + c∂D
S(pS)
∂pS
DB(pB) = 0
= DB(pB)DS(pS) + (pB + pS − c)∂DS(pS)
∂pS
DB(pB) = 0.
Therefore
(pB + pS − c)∂D
B(pB)
∂pB
DS(pS) = (pB + pS − c)∂D
S(pS)
∂pS
DB(pB)
∂DB(pB)
∂pB
DS(pS) =
∂DS(pS)
∂pS
DB(pB)
∂DB(pB)
∂pB
DB(pB)
=
∂DS(pS)
∂pS
DS(pS)
(4)
Taking the buyer/seller price elasticities of demand,
ηB = −
dDB
DB
dpB
pB
= −pB dD
B/dpB
DB
ηS = −
dDS
DS
dpS
pS
= −pS dD
S/dpS
DS
and inferring that the infinitesimals take the same form,
ηi = −pi
∂Di
∂pi
Di
i = B, S
the expression
ηi
pi
=
∂Di
∂pi
Di
can be substituted into condition 4, obtaining the equilibrium condition (Rochet and
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Tirole, 2003, p. 996)
ηB
pB
=
ηS
pS
which, together with Lerner’s formula (with demand elasticity η = p∂V/∂p
V
)
p− c
p
= − 1
p∂V/∂p
V
=
1
η
p
p− c = p
∂V/∂p
V
= η
provides
1
p− c =
η
p
=
ηB
pB
=
ηS
pS
.
Note that this may be written also in numerous other forms, see e.g. Rochet and
Tirole (2006, p. 654). Also note that while this takes the form of a general law, it is
identical to equation 4 with merely the definition of the elasticities applied. It would also
be exceedingly difficult to verify empirically or computationally as the derivatives with
respect to pi are usually not known.
A.4. The Unique Nash-Equilibrium Between Buyers and Sellers
The buyer and seller demand system (2) is four dimensional with the dimensions being
NB, NS, pB, and pS. The dimensions N i are endogenous and the pi exogenous. The
network sizes N i depend mutually on each other and would continue to adjust until a Nash
equilibrium is found. In the Nash equilibrium no user14 has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate. Depending on the shape of the curves N i(pi, N j), there may be multiple or no
equilibria (for given sets of exogenous pi).However, Rochet and Tirole exclude this quite
real possibility (see figure 9) by stating that ”under regularity conditions, the system
has a unique solution characterizing memberships NB and NS as functions of (pB, pS)”
(Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 653). Unfortunately, it does not become clear what these
regularity conditions are, and what kind of distribution for the bi is required to assure the
equilibrium. From a dynamical systems perspective it is also not clear whether a potentially
existing equilibrium would be stable, or whether it could be reached from reasonable initial
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Figure 9: Determination of critical network sizes of network nj required for user i to join
(denoted nj∗) depending on the utility parameters of user i, Bi, bi, Ai, and ai.
conditions. We are able to explore these questions with our ABM introduced in section 4.
From the utility function (1) it then follows that for users of type i a critical size of
the network j, nj∗, can be found for which they are indifferent to join or not to join the
network with
nj∗ =
−(Bi − Ai)
bi − ai (5)
where −(Bi − Ai) is the axis intercept of the utility as function of nj and (bi − ai) is its
slope (see figure 9). Generally, it would be reasonable to assume the slope to be positive,15
which means that for all agents, either the critical size nj∗ is a minimum critical size (right
part of the function in figure 9) or it does not exist and the agent will always join the
network (left part of the function in figure 9). Since Rochet and Tirole assume that Bi is
often negative (Rochet and Tirole, 2006, p. 652) (and imply a non-negative entry fee Ai),
we take the first case (there exists a minimum critical value nj∗) for all users as a starting
point in this example. (Otherwise, the demand functions Di(pj, N j) would simply have a
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positive intercept, Di(pj, 0) > 0.)
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B. Analytical treatment of the problem of a unique equilibrium
in the Rochet/Tirole model
As mentioned in section 3.5, to obtain a system with a unique and stable equilibrium as
assumed by Rochet and Tirole, the network size (demand) functions of the buyers and
sellers need to have a concave shape with a high initial slope such that there exists exactly
one Nash equilibrium. Here we will provide an exhaustive analytical treatment of the
”regularity conditions” that are necessary to ensure the unique and stable equilibrium.
These assumptions are not discussed and made transparent in the original papers by
Rochet and Tirole and are highly dubious in many situations where TSM play a role. This
fact substantiates our claim that a sole focus on equilibrium models for the analysis of
TSM is misplaced.
The network size (demand) functions are essentially cumulative distribution functions
multiplied by the a factor Zi such that they give absolute values, not shares. If they
are to be concave and monotonically increasing (∂f(x)
∂x
> 0, ∂
2f(x)
∂2x
< 0) the corresponding
probability distribution function must be positive and monotonically falling (f(x) > 0,
∂f(x)
∂x
< 0). Since this is the distribution function over the minimum critical sizes of network
N j , nj∗, the required shape is conveniently produced by the function for nj∗ (see equation
(5) in appendix A) if a simple uniform distribution, s ∼ U(smin, smax) is supplied for the
per transaction benefits b. We obtain (for s << smax)
bi(s) = s
nj∗(s) =
−(Bi − Ai)
bi(s)− ai =
−(Bi − Ai)
s− ai
As noted above, values s < ai would be self-defeating since in that case, the customer
would incur more and more losses with each transaction (and would therefore refrain
from conducting any transactions). Let us therefore assume for this computation an
smin = a
i. 3 The resulting function is given in figure 10b; it is a bijective map between bi
and the minimum number of customers of the other type for the present i customer to
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participate, n∗j . Since it is bijective, we can rearrange parts of the map such that we have
the part which results in participation, ai ≤ bi(= s) ≤ smax first and sort it to become a
monotonically increasing function (i.e., effectively turn it around since it is monotonically
decreasing in figure 10b), yielding figure 10c, or, functionally:
nj∗(smax − s) = −(B
i − Ai)
(smax − ai)− bi(s) =
−(Bi − Ai)
(smax − ai)− s (6)
Figure 10c could now also be read the other way around (s as dependent on nj∗), which
now gives the exact part of the distribution that will join the network if nj∗ customers of
the other type also participate. That gives the demand function Di(nj). 4 Functionally,
this is the inverse of equation 6,
Di(nj) = s(nj∗) = smax − ai + B
i − Ai
nj
,
as depicted in figure 10d. In this case it results in two equilibria, one of which is stable.
Note that increasing ai shifts the right (stable) equilibrium leftward, closer to the other
one.
As discussed in the main text, there are many situations in which these assumptions
would be violated. Figure 11 shows the example discussed in section 3.5 in which we have
two groups of customers, some who use their credit cards all the time, and other who use
them only for particular purposes. This plausible situation results in a system of demand
functions with four equilibria two of which would be stable.
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Figure 10: Demands and equilibria resulting from uniformly distributed bi (and constant
Bi)
40
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
-2  0  2  4  6  8  10
ai=smin smax
P D
F
bi
(a) Distribution of bi
-4
-2
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 0  2  4  6  8  10
ai
n
j * ( b
i )
bi
(b) Critical values nj∗ as a function of bi (with
constant Bi, Ai, ai)
-4
-2
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 0  2  4  6  8  10
smax-a
i smaxnj *
( s m
a
x-
bi
) = n
j * ( s
m
a
x-
s )
smax-b
i
=smax-s
(c) Critical values nj∗ in increasing order
-4
-2
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 0  2  4  6  8  10
D
i =
s ( n
j * ) ,
  n
i
Dj=s(ni*), nj
(d) Resulting system of demand functions ni =
D(nj), nj = D(ni)
Figure 11: Demands and equilibria resulting from a two-peaked distribution of bi (and
constant Bi)
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Notes
1More extensive lists of examples are given in, e.g. Rochet and Tirole (2003) or Meyer (2012).
2For a brief historical overview, see section 5 in Shy (2011).
3ai is the transaction fee set by the provider, shifting ai into the distribution would just remove a part
of the distribution, so we would for the present computation be interested in just the remaining part,
U(ai, smax).
4Note that this would have to be normalized by the range of the uniform distributed variable s; the
shape of the function would, however, not change.
5Rochet and Tirole’s model also allows for a membership return Bi. We have this attribute included in
our model but set it to zero as it is done by Rochet and Tirole for most cases considered by them.
6This is due to the observation that providers typically do not interfere with the terms of the transaction
between their customers. Consequently, this is modeled as buyer’s and seller’s reservation prices for the
transaction. Note that this results in a slight change compared to the case with uniformly distributed
bi that was found to approximate the Rochet-Tirole case of the unique Nash-equilibrium in the demand
functions. Allowing transfers between bB and bS results in bi being distributed U2.
7We do not set this probability to 100% because in the case of only one provider, this would enable the
provider to exploit the agents since they would be forced to join her network again as soon as they left
it in order to avoid the associated losses.
8The parameters of the differential evolution are chosen in accordance with the literature (Liu and
Lampinen, 2005; Koloseni et al., 2013).
9See Bendor et al. (2001) for a discussion of this formal approach and its historical development.
10Price corrections use a slow geometric moving average over past and current target values. Corrections
for the different kinds of fees are assessed separately (i.e. they may move into different directions at
the same time).
11This is to avoid vastly negative revenues caused by negative prices or entry fees. This is necessary as
the success of a strategy in step 2 is evaluated in relative terms compared to the last round; negative
but slightly increasing revenue would therefore be deemed to indicate a successful strategy.
12A (multiplicative) combination of the revenue and number of customers in the last round can also be
used; it will lead to very similar results.
13Note that for the case without satisficing, the buyer revenue is sometimes negative but this again is a
result of (by chance occurring) dysfunctional networks with exceptionally high prices that are present
in a minority of runs but have an impact on the average.
14And since the users react mechanically, the number of users could game theoretically be seen as strategies
of a single buyer-agent and a single seller-agent reacting to each other’s strategies.
15Otherwise, the agent’s utility would fall with the number of transactions which, in turn, would raise the
question, why she would then undertake these transactions and why she would join the network in the
first place, though she might do that because of a generous transfer in the form of a negative access
price Ai.
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